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A Government of
Limited Powers
by Carl E. Schneider

scoe C. Filburn owned a small
arm in Ohio where he raised
oultry, dairy cows, and a modest acreage of winter wheat. Some wheat
he fed his animals, some he sold, and
some he kept for his family's daily
bread. The Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938 limited the wheat Mr. Filburn
could grow without incurring penalties,
but his 1941 crop exceeded those limits.
Mr. Filburn sued. He said Claude
Wickard, the Secretary of Agriculture,
could not enforce the AAI\s limits because Congress lacked authority to regulate wheat grown for one's own use.
He reasoned: In our federal system, the
states have authority to legislate except
where the Constitution constrains
them, but the federal government may
legislate only where the Constitution
authorizes it. The Constitution permits
Congress to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several
States" and may "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" its Commerce
Clause powers. Mr. Filburn thought
that growing and eating wheat on his
land were acts "local in character" and
that "their effects upon interstate commerce are at most 'indirect."'
Diane Monson lives in California.
She has been growing marijuana she
takes to treat substantial medical problems. The California Compassionate
Use Act of 1996 exempts from criminal
liability "patients ... who possess or
cultivate marijuana for medicinal purposes with the recommendation or approval of a physician." However, the
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federal Controlled Substances Act classifies marijuana as a "Schedule I" drug.
Such drugs have a "high potential for
abuse" and no "accepted medical use,"
and it is a federal crime to manufacture,
distribute, or possess them.
Diane Monson (with Angel Raich,
another patient using marijuana) went
to court to argue that Alberto Gonzales,
the Attorney General, could not enforce
the CSA against her or her doctors because Congress lacks authority to regulate the marijuana she grows for her
own use. Ms. Monson argued that the
Commerce Clause does not authorize
Congress to "prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law."
In 1942, Wickard v. Filburn reached
the Supreme Court. The Justices agreed
that the AAA was constitutional. They
quoted Chief Justice Harlan Stone:
"The commerce power is not confined
in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to
those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce ... as to make regulation of them appropriate means to
the attainment of a legitimate end."
Thus, "even if appellee's activity be local
and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still ... be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."
Mr. Filburn's wheat affected interstate
commerce because it kept him from
buying somebody else's wheat. And
while his crop was small, its effect,
"taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."

On June 6 of this year, Justices decided six to three that Congress may
regulate Ms. Monson's marijuana garden. Justice Stevens said for the Court
that the Commerce Clause was "the
Framers' response to the central problem giving rise to the Constitution itself: the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of Confederation." Thus the Commerce
Clause power is capacious, and "case
law firmly establishes Congress' power
to regulate purely local activities that are
part of an economic 'class of activities'
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."
The principle of stare decisis obliges
American courts to decide similar cases
similarly. Raich virtually was Wickard.
"Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible commodity for
which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market. Just as the AAA
controlled the amount of wheat in interstate and foreign commerce, "a primary purpose of the CSA is to control
the supply and demand of controlled
substances in both lawful and unlawful
drug markets."
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor and Thomas invoked two recent cases that examined
statutes enacted on the authority of the
Commerce Clause. In 1995, United
States v. Lopez held that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded
Congress's authority. That law made it a
crime to have a gun near a school. The
Court said that the Act was "a criminal
statute that ... has nothing to do with
commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms," and the Court therefore held that the Act violated the Commerce Clause. In 2000, United States v.
Morrison similarly found the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 unconstitutional. That law "created a federal
civil remedy for the victims of gendermotivated crimes of violence." Despite
"congressional findings that such crimes
had an adverse impact on interstate
commerce, we held the statute unconstitutional because, like the statute in
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Lopez, it did not regulate economic activity."
The majority thought Lopez and
Morrison sufficiently different from
Wickard and Raich that they could be
decided differently. The latter cases involved "quintessentially economic"
acts-producing, distributing, and consuming commodities that had an established interstate market-while the former cases involved not economic activity, but crimes of violence. The former
cases affected interstate commerce proximately; the latter only remotely.
The dissenters, on the other hand,
thought Raich was closer to Lopez and
Morrison than Wickard. They doubted
that raising marijuana for one's own
medical use is "economic" activity. Even
if it is, they said, it is not economic activity that perceptibly affects any national market: 'There is simply no evidence
that homegrown medicinal marijuana
users constitute, in the aggregate, a sizable enough class to have a discernable,
let alone substantial, impact on the national illicit drug market." Problems
would arise only if marijuana were diverted to illegal uses. Would that happen? Not in Justice O'Connor's eyes:
"We generally assume states enforce
their laws." ("'If the law supposes that,'
said Mr. Bumble, squeezing his hat emphatically in both hands, 'the law is a
ass-a idiot."')
The dissent, then, thought Congress
had not shown that interstate commerce
was sufficiently affected. But, the majority said, Congress need not make such a
showing. Congress only needs a "rational basis" for anticipating a sufficient effect on commerce. The CSA as a whole
plainly affected interstate commerce. It
mattered not that, sliced fine enough,
individual slivers did not.
More broadly, the majority thought,
the dissent "overlook[ed] the larger context of modern-era Commerce Clause
jurisprudence." In the early New Deal,
the Court used the Commerce Clause
(and the Due Process Clause) to savage
New Deal legislation. New Dealers
protested that the Justices were abusing
these ambiguous clauses to promote
their own political views and class interests. By the late 1930s, the Court was
12

chastened, and Wickard was part of its
pledge of repentance and promise of reform. During the civil rights movement,
again, Congress wanted to reach intrastate behavior once more. Again it
found authority in the Commerce
Clause, and again the Court interpreted
that authority generously.
"Scarcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question,"
Tocqueville said. So when judges decide
legal questions, they appear to be answering political questions. The press
coverage of Raich, for instance, regularly
treats the case as a ruling on the policy
of legalizing marijuana for medical purposes.
Judges see their work differently.
They too have limited powers. Their assignment is only to decide whether government has acted within the scope of
its constitutional authority. As the Raich
majority said, "The question before us
... is not whether it is wise to enforce
the [CSA] in these circumstances; rather
it is whether Congress' power to regulate
interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of
those markets that are supplied with
drugs produced and consumed locally."
As Justice O'Connor said in dissent,
"[I] f I were a California legislator I
would not have supported the Compassionate Use Act. But whatever the wisdom of California's experiment ... , the
federal principles that have driven our
Commerce Clause cases require that
room for experiment be protected in
this case."
Far from imagining it has resolved
the debate over marijuana policy, the
Raich majority thinks that political
question is open: The CSA "authorizes
[administrative] procedures for the reclassification of Schedule I drugs. But
perhaps even more important than these
legal avenues is the democratic process,
in which the voices of voters allied with
these respondents may one day be heard
in the halls of Congress."
To the Court, then, Raich is not a
medical marijuana case any more than
Wickard was a wheat case. Raich is a federalism case. When the Justices received
the case, they said, "Wow, here's

Wickard v. Filburn, an old friend from
law school," not ''At last, here's the medical marijuana problem." When they
read the briefs, heard the oral argument,
and drafted their opinions, they were repeatedly brought back to two centuries
of cases interpreting the Commerce
Clause-to Wickard, Lopez, Morrison,
and their kith and kin. The justices had
to think and to write in terms of those
cases.
Raich and its forebears are about constitutional law in its core sense-about
how American government is constituted. Allocating authority between the
federal and state governments has been
central to the compromises that made a
"United States of America'' possible, to
the battles between Hamiltonians and
Jeffersonians, the Civil War, the response to industrialization, the struggle
over civil rights, and policy today. Thus
Justice O'Connor's dissent begins, "We
enforce the 'outer limits' of Congress'
Commerce Clause authority not for
their own sake, but to protect historic
spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment and thereby
to maintain the distribution of power
fundamental to our federalist system of
government." A federalist vision of
states as laboratories of democracy encouraged the Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg to leave states free to permit
or prohibit assisted suicide. Next term in
Gonzales v. Oregon the Court will assess
the Attorney General's authority under
the CSA-and hence the Commerce
Clause-to regulate the use of drugs for
assisted suicide.
Still, the majority and minority in
Raich may not be desperately far apart.
They presumably agree that the Commerce Clause grants Congress impressive scope. They presumably agree that
federal power has some limits. They disagree within the uncertain borderland
surrounding those limits, a borderland
they negotiate guided by Delphictongued oracles-clauses that are majestically vague and precedents that offer
analogies but not rules. Raich has now
joined Wickard as one of those oracles in
the unending effort to define the limited
powers of the federal government.
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